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LEGAL ANATOMY OF AN AIR 
POLLUTION EMERGENCY 
By Doug Rendleman'*' 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 1971 in Birmingham, Alabama the emergency 
section of the federal Clean Air Act was used for the first time. 
Particulate emissions had combined with an inversion to raise 
Birmingham's particulate count over 750. Neither the state nor the 
local government was able to act. The federal Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, early in the morning of November 18, secured a 
temporary restraining order. Twenty-three major industries, em-
ploying a total of about 25,000 production employees, were ordered 
either to phase down or to curtail production in order to lessen 
particulate emissions drastically. Less than 36 hours later the tem-
porary restraining order was dissolved on the motion of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency. 
This article will discuss the legal aspects of the November crisis. 
The federal emergency legislation and its legislative history will be 
examined, and the Environmental Protection Agency's response to 
the legislation will be summarized, with an emphasis on particulate 
pollution. With the federal framework thus explained, the article 
will describe the local background: the setting of Birmingham and 
its air pollution problem, the then operative state and local con-
trols, and the events of the emergency itself. Attention will then 
turn to the lawsuit, United States v. U.S. Steel, which was the En-
vironmental Protection Agency's solution for the November crisis; 
an analysis will be made of the temporary restraining order secured 
therein and its dissolution the next day. Following a summary of 
the events of the lawsuit, the article will consider the fundamental 
legal problems attendant to the regulatory process. The lack of 
notice to the Birmingham defendants and the difficulties that re-
sulted are singled out for extended comment. In addition, hard-
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ships arising from the use of "temporary" orders to attain "final" 
relief are discussed. The writer concludes that the order should 
have been preceded by notice and by some species of hearing, espe-
cially since it might have been foreseen that the order would be 
effectively final. The writer then explores possible remedies for 
incorrectly enjoined defendants, finds them wanting, and suggests 
an amendment to the legislation in order to ameliorate injustices 
created by incorrect emergency orders. 
THE LEGISLATION 
The serious federal scheme of air pollution control began in 
1967.1 The legislation authorized funds for state and local regula-
tory programs and required HEW (1) to divide the nation into 
areas and regions, (2) to promulgate criteria for air quality in each 
region, and (3) to issue technological documents to the states. The 
states were to set standards and to establish plans for enforcement. 
Although the state and local governments had primary responsi-
bility for enforcement, HEW could act to enforce state standards 
if the state was not enforcing its own standards and if the pollution 
traveled interstate. In the case of intrastate pollution, HEW could 
only act upon a request by the governor of the state. HR 9509, the 
administration bill, contained no emergency powers. S. 780 in-
cluded emergency powers which became §108(k) of the Air Quality 
Act of 1967. It provided: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the Secretary, 
upon receipt of evidence that a particular pollution source or combi-
nation of sources (including moving sources) is presenting an im-
minent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons, and 
finding that appropriate State or local authorities have not acted to 
abate such sources, may request the Attorney General to bring suit 
on behalf of the United States in the appropriate United States 
district court to immediately enjoin any contributor to the alleged 
pollution to stop the emission of contaminants causing such pol-
lution or to take such other action as may be necessary.2 
The 1967 Act was unsatisfactory. The procedure to establish 
standards and attain compliance was cumbersome and time-consum-
ing.8 For example, as of September, 1970 only one case had pro-
ceeded beyond the preliminary conference stage. In that case, it 
had taken five years--through the conference, to the public hear-
ing and the courts--to shut down a Maryland chicken-processing 
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factory.4 There were not enough funds or personnel in either the 
state or the federal governments. Enforcement, in short, was diffi-
cult.1> There is no indication that any action was taken under the 
emergency powers in §108(k).6 
The Clean Air Amendments of 19707 were designed to remedy 
the defects in the earlier legislation. The Environmental Protection 
Agency was created to assume responsibility under the Act. With 
respect to establishing criteria and standards the 1970 Amendments 
do not require the extended procedure required by the earlier 
legislation. Moreover, the 1970 Amendments delegate to the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency substantially 
more power to intervene in state implementation and enforcement. 
The emergency provision from the 1967 Act was carried forward 
by the 1970 Act;8 it requires both (1) pollution which "is present-
ing an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of 
persons" and (2) state or local inaction. Both the committee reports 
and testimony before the committees shed light on the language. 
When the Clean Air Act was enacted in 1967, the Senate Public 
Works Committee and the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce stressed the need for the emergency provision 
as an interim measure to allow some control while the Secretary 
of HEW was developing enforcible standards.9 The emergency ex-
ception, the committees felt, was not designed to short circuit the 
elaborate procedure of the rest of the act for "chronic or generally 
recurring pollution problems."lo Rather, it was to be used when 
"there ... [was] an unusual atmospheric inversion or other extraor-
dinary grouping of circumstances creating a substantial and immi-
nent danger to public health ... "11 Both reports cited as examples: 
Donora in 1948, London in 1952 and 1962, the Meuse Valley in 
Belgium in 1930, and New York City in 1953.12 According to testi-
mony before and material submitted to the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, at Donora "an industrial town 
which, in 1948, normally recorded about one death every 3 days, 
17 people died in a single 24-hour period during a 4 day smog."13 
During the London fog of 1952 "4,000 more deaths occurred in 
that city than would normally have happened during a similar 
period of time."14 The cause of these tragedies, according to mate-
rial submitted to the committee by the Public Health Service, 
seems to have been sulfuric acid.15 Such events are in the words of 
former Surgeon General Dr. Stewart "dramatic and tragic"16 and 
emphasize the need for effective emergency remedies.17 It was ap-
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parent after the 1967 legislation that Congress intended the emer-
gency provisions to apply to the serious, the exacerbated and the 
immediately dangerous pollution hazard. 
Section 303 of the 1970 amendments reenacted the emergency 
provision of the 1967 legislation with some technical changes.18 
Legislative documents reveal a new sense of urgency and purpose. 
The Senate Report on S. 4348 stated: 
The legislation reported by the committee is the result of deep con-
cern for protection of the health of the American people. Air pol-
lution is not only an aesthetic nuisance. The Committee's concern 
with direct adverse effects upon public health has increased since 
the publication of air quality criteria documents for five major 
pollutants (oxides of sulfur, particulates, carbon monoxide, hydro-
carbons and oxidants). These documents indicate that the air pol-
lution problem is more severe, more pervasive, and growing at a 
more rapid rate than was generally believed.19 
The statement on the federal government's emergency powers 
reveals a new emphasis and a changed definition of emergency: 
The committee believes that this emergency authority is necessary 
to provide for immediate, effective action whenever air pollution 
agents reach levels of concentration that are associated with (1) the 
production of significant health effects, (2) incapacitating body 
damage, or (3) irreversible body damage in any significant portion 
of the general population. The term "significant portion" is not 
intended to exclude sensitive elements of society as asthmatics, but 
only those groups of particularly susceptible persons for whom other 
precautionary measures should be taken. Secondly, the emergency 
situation exists whenever there is any perceptible increase in the 
mortality rate. 
The levels of concentration of air pollution agents or combinations 
of agents which substantially endanger health are levels which should 
never be reached in any community. When the prediction can 
reasonably be made that such elevated levels could be reached even 
for a short period of time-that is that they are imminent-an 
emergency action plan should be implemented to reduce emissions 
of air pollution agents and prevent the occurrence of substantial 
endangerment.2O 
The Committee felt that vigorous emergency action should be 
forthcoming from the federal government: 
The Committee is not satisfied with existing State and local aIr 
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pollution alert strategies. Recommendations that children not run 
to and from school and that events be suspended are not a substitute 
for reducing pollution. The Committee believes that air pollution 
alerts authority should include plans which provide for the im-
mediate reduction of non-essential operations which contribute to 
an episode situation.21 
Thus, with a heightened sense of urgency and a broader sense of 
emergency, Congress handed the Administrator the old legislation 
in new clothes.22 
Information and guidelines promulgated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency in August and October 1971 to assist States in 
drafting plans also bear on the meaning of emergency. These 
criteria do not bind the federal administrator's discretion to act 
under §303. Nevertheless, they are relevant in defining an emer-
gency since the regulations cite §303 and distinctly hold out the 
possibility that if the quality standards are exceeded and if the 
state either lacks a plan or fails to act under an existing plan, then 
the federal administrator will act under the powers granted in 
§303.23 Each state plan for a Priority 1 region must include, as part 
of a graduated response to a possible pollution episode, a "contin-
gency plan" to decrease emissions in an emergency. An emergency 
episode is "an immediate and serious threat of significant harm to 
the health of any significant portion of the general population."24 
The plan must be divided into two stages, warning and emergency. 
It must be preventative rather than remedial: the local authorities 
must be prepared to act in anticipation of the actual emergency 
levels "to prevent ambient pollutant concentrations at any location 
... from reaching such levels which would cause significant harm 
to the health of persons, ... "25 Concentration levels for six pollu-
tants are included in the regulation: only particulate matter will be 
discussed herein. A preventable emergency is defined as 1,000 par-
ticulate micrograms per cubic meter.26 Accordingly, an emergency 
may be declared when the particulate count reaches 875 "and 
meteorological conditions are such that this condition can be 
expected to remain at the above levels for twelve (12) or more 
hours."27 The plan must include "an emergency episode plan." The 
Regulations set out examples which "reflect generally recognized 
ways of preventing air pollution from reaching "emergency 
levels."28 In an emergency it is suggested that open burning and 
incineration be forbidden. In addition, almost all employers "shall 
immediately close operations." There are exceptions for distribu-
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tion and sale of medical supplies and food and for vital public 
services. Motor vehicles may not be used except with police ap-
proval. Sources of pollution in general must eliminate pollution 
"to the extent possible without causing injury to persons or dam-
age to equipment."29 
There are two other stages of response in the regulation ex-
amples. A pollution alert may be declared when the particulate 
count averages 375 for 24 hours and that level can be predicted to 
continue for twelve hours. In an alert, open burning is forbidden, 
the use of incinerators and boiler lancing or soot blowing is limited, 
and "unnecessary" vehicle use should be eliminated. Pollution 
sources should diminish or defer production, delay polluting waste 
disposal, lessen heat loads, and use midday turbulence as much as 
possible in order to reduce pollution substantially.so The second 
level of response is the pollution warning that is to be declared 
when the particulate count reaches 625 and can be predicted to 
continue for twelve hours in the absence of control action.31 In a 
pollution warning, emission and activity controls are intensified. 
For example, in addition to eliminating unnecessary vehicle use, 
the public is asked to use car pools and public transportation. The 
suggested classified manufacturing regulations are, for the alert, 
"substantial" or "maximum" reduction of pollution, and, for the 
warning, "elimination" of pollutants.s2 The final level of response 
is the emergency which was discussed above.ss Under the examples, 
the classified manufacturing industries will have reached maximum 
pollution control in the pollution warning, so that nothing further 
is required in the pollution emergency.S4 
THE LOCAL BACKGROUND 
BirminghamS5 
Birmingham is a steel and iron city located between mountains. 
The mountains supply raw material for several major industries 
and prevent air circulation that would dispel some of the air's 
particulates, sulphur oxide and carbon monoxide. A "dark cloud 
of industrial waste" is endemic in the industrial sections of Birm-
ingham. Federal authorities designate a particulate count of 260 
as a critical level which should not be exceeded more than once a 
year. The downtown Birmingham monitoring station recorded a 
particulate count in excess of 260 on 67 days in 1970; in April, 
1971 the downtown count reached 607. The 1970 average for the 
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industrial North Birmingham monitoring station was 280. Dr. 
Russakoff, a Birmingham physician, conducted a study of resident's 
lung functions and reported that 30% of those tested in North 
Birmingham had in this regard measurable deterioration.s6 Patients 
with lung diseases were told by Birmingham doctors, "Leave Birm-
ingham or buy a coffin." 
State Law 
State and local officials were powerless to control ambient pollu-
tion, simply because, until 1971, governmental regulation of air 
pollution was almost nonexistent. The Alabama Air Pollution Con-
trol Commission was required to issue a permit to a violator of its 
rules if the violator submitted a plan to attain compliance with the 
rules within seven years. The violator was allowed "a reasonable 
time" to study the problem and to develop the plan.37 This legisla-
tion had been drafted by industrial representatives; significantly, 
Alabama was the only state to be refused federal matching funds 
under the Clean Air Act for air pollution control. Public concern 
and a dramatic pollution episode in April 1971 led to new legisla-
tion. The Governor announced that he would sign the strongest 
anti-pollution bill the legislature could pass. The legislature acted 
and much stricter legislation became effective on September 3, 
1971.s8 In an air pollution emergency, the Governor almost has the 
power to declare martial law. He may, for example, by proclama-
tion, "prohibit ... the burning of any materials whatsoever."s9 The 
governor may call out the National Guard; and enforcement offi-
cials "may use such reasonable force as is required."40 Yet in No-
vember 1971, an emergency could not be declared under the new 
state legislation since the commission members had been appointed 
only about a week, the commission director had not yet been se-
lected, and Jefferson County (Birmingham) had no operative emer-
gency regulations. Thus, the local and state officials "were without 
effective legal authority to abate an ... emergency situation."41 
November~ 1971 
On the 14th and 15th of November, 1971, particulates began to 
accumulate in Birmingham and Jefferson County.42 The particu-
lates did not dissipate because of poor atmospheric mixing, or what 
is frequently called an inversion. On Monday afternoon, November 
15, the National Weather Service issued an Air Stagnation Advisory 
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for central Alabama, and the Bureau of Environmental Health of 
the Jefferson County Department of Health began additional air 
sampling at selected monitoring stations. The Department of 
Health declared an air pollution alert at 10 a.m., November 16 
because samples for the 24-hour period ending at 8 a.m. revealed 
a particulate count of 771 at North Birmingham and 397 in down-
town Birmingham. The public was notified by the news media. 
Twenty-three industrial sources, each estimated by their own data 
to contribute 100 tons or more of particulates to the air each year, 
were telephoned and asked to reduce overnight emissions voluntar-
ily. At 4:30 p.m. on November 16, the Department of Health 
issued an air pollution warning because of a particulate count of 
722 in North Birmingham. Notices from Dr. Hardy, a Health 
Officer of the Department, were delivered to the 23 industries 
"requesting ... substantial reductions in particulate emissions as 
soon as possible." The request was specific: "Due to the seriousness 
of the situation, this office feels that an overall particulate emission 
reduction on the order of 60% is justified." In addition, the 23 
sources should "maintain said reduction until the warning is termi-
nated." The Health Department also asked for prompt written re-
ports of any emergency action taken and an estimate of particulate 
reduction. This "pollution warning" had, of course, no legal ef-
fect.43 
At 8 a.m. on November 17 the North Birmingham particulate 
count was 758; the Weather Service continued the Air Stagnation 
Advisory for 24 hours. The Health Department called the indus-
trial sources that morning to learn the effect of the pollution warn-
ing. Nine of the 23 reported that they were reducing particulate 
emission 60% or more; 8 reported reductions of 20 to 60% and 6 
either could not estimate reductions or were reducing emissions 
less than 20%. Because, however, the major sources of particulates 
were among the 6 which could not estimate reductions, the com-
bined efforts to reduce particulates were effective only to the extent 
of 15%. Written replies were received from 18 of the 23 sources 
later in the day. On the basis of these replies, it was estimated that 
total emissions of particulates might be reduced 25 to 30%, about 
half of the reduction requested on November 16. 
Throughout the episode, the Jefferson County Health officials 
had consulted the Alabama Department of Health and the State 
Attorney General. The latter, in response to a pollution crisis in 
April, had a nuisance action pending in Jefferson County Circuit 
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Court against several of the industrial sources. National and re-
gional offices of the federal Environmental Protection Agency had 
been in communication; and on the morning of November 17 the 
Emergency Operations Control Center of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency asked whether their office could come to Birming-
ham as observers. The county and state health officials, aware of the 
Environmental Protection Agency's emergency powers under the 
Clean Air Act,44 granted the request. The state and local officials 
met with Environmental Protection Agency representatives and 
attorneys from the United States Department of Justice on the 
afternoon of November 17. An Environmental Protection Agency 
spokesman told a late-afternoon press conference that his agency 
was reviewing the problem and that recommendations for action 
would be released later.41i 
The upshot was United States v. U.S. Steel.46 The Environmental 
Protection Agency's case consisted of a complaint, three affidavits, 
and a motion for a temporary restraining order. A temporary re-
straining order was granted by District Judge Pointer at his home 
on November 18, 1971 at 1:45 a.m. The complaint was dismissed 
and the temporary restraining order dissolved on the government's 
motion on the morning of November 19. The next portion of the 
article will examine the case in depth. 
UNITED STATES v. U.S. STEEL 
The complaint alleged a particulate count of 725, which was 
caused or contributed to by the 23 named defendants. There were 
further allegations that the pollution presented "an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to the health of persons," and that state 
and local officials had been diligent but unsuccessful in their efforts 
to abate the pollution crisis. The complaint recited the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's emergency powers under §303 of the 
Clean Air Act,47 alleged irreparable harm, and asked for an injunc-
tion requiring the 23 defendants to "cease the discharge of par-
ticulate matter into the ambient air . . . and not discharge such 
matter thereafter unless pursuant to instruction to do so from this 
Court." 
The motion for an immediate temporary restraining order al-
leged that particulate pollution from the defendants' operations 
combined with "adverse weather conditions" to cause a "present 
and continuing" health hazard. In addition, the motion alleged 
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the defendants' lack of response to local attempts to reduce atmo-
spheric contaminations. The court was asked to issue the temporary 
restraining order without notice to the defendants "on the ground 
that the discharges constitute[ d] an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to the health of persons." The order that was then re-
quested was less drastic than the injunction prayed for in the com-
plaint. Rather than ask the court to require the defendants to 
"cease" emissions, the government requested that, while action on 
the complaint was pending, the court restrain the defendants tem-
porarily "from discharging excessive particulate matter into the 
ambient air." 
The motion was supported by three affidavits. Dr. Hammer, an 
Environmental Protection Agency specialist in general preventative 
medicine, stated his opinion that "exposure to ambient particulate 
levels of greater than 700 micrograms per cubic meter per twenty-
four hours for two consecutive days would constitute . . . an im-
mediate and serious threat of significant harm to the health of a 
significant portion of the general population." Robert Kornasie-
wicz, an Environmental Protection Agency meteorologist, stated 
that the Birmingham forecast office of the N ational Weather Ser-
vice had issued an Air Stagnation Advisory. This meant that "there 
is limited vertical mixing of pollutants" and "unless emissions of 
pollutants are curtailed or terminated, the concentrations of such 
pollutants will increase." There was, according to Mr. Kornasie-
wicz, a possibility that the stagnation advisory would be suspended 
because of a frontal system that was moving toward Birmingham 
from the west. However, it was noted that the frontal system could 
stop or slow down and that it was not expected to reach Birm-
ingham until 11:00 a.m. November 19; moreover, even if it 
did reach Birmingham, "dispersion ... [would] still be poor for 
some time." Charles Robinson, supervisor of the air pollution con-
trol program for the Jefferson County Health Department, pro-
vided the pollution count. Sampling between 2 p.m. on November 
15 and 2:30 p.m. on November 17 revealed particulate counts of 
722, 728, 758 and 771; and the average particulate level for the 
45 hours ending at 2:30 p.m. on November 17 was 725. 
The affidavits supported the allegations of the motion, and pur-
suant to the emergency power in §303 of the Clean Air Act and the 
federal rules of civil procedure,48 the court was empowered to act.49 
The temporary restraining order, which was signed at 1 :45 a.m., is 
specific in its terms and broad in its application,GO The 27 affected 
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operations were separately treated. The order was tailored to each 
operation, and it compromised the limiting or arresting of partic-
ulate pollution with concern for the enterprise and production 
equipment. The order read, in part: 
U. S. STEEL CORPORATION-Fairfield Works 
Must stop the emission of particulate matter from incineration, 
scrafing, slag quenching, open burning and other operations that 
can be postponed. 
Must increase coking time to the maximum extent possible consistent 
with gas heating requirements. 
Must reduce emissions of particulate matter from all open hearth 
furnaces by ceasing feed to the open hearth and maintaining the 
heat. (Emphasis added.) 
In general, the industries were allowed to finish work in progress: 
BIRMINGHAM STOVE AND RANGE COMPANY 
Must eliminate emissions of particulate matter from all cupolas 
adding no new charges and shutting down cupolas after present heat 
is finished . ... 
VULCAN MATERIALS COMPANY-Fairfield Works 
Must eliminate emissions of particulate matter by phasing down 
all operations as rapidly as possible without causing damage to 
equipment. (Emphasis added.) 
Some operations, however, received a stiffer dose: 
W. J. BULLOCK, INC. 
Must eliminate emission of particulate matter by shutting down all 
furnaces and smelters and stopping all incineration processes. 
(Emphasis added.) 
A hearing on the preliminary injunction was set for 9 a.m. on N 0-
vember 19, 32 hours after the temporary restraining order was 
issued. The complaint, affidavits, motion and order were repro-
duced. Marshalls began serving the papers together with summons 
early in the morning of November 18. Some of the industries re-
ceived a telephone call at 5:30 a.m. or 6 a.m. on the 18th.51 
In the hours between the grant of the temporary restraining 
order at 1 :45 a.m. on the 17th and the hearing on the preliminary 
injunction at 9 a.m. on the 19th, the pollution crisis ended. Bir-
mingham was blessed with, among other things, an autumn rain 
that "washed" the particulates out of the air. The North Birming-
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ham high volume particulate sampling results for November 16, 17 
and 18 were 771, 758 and 410. The particulate count on Novem-
ber 19 was 98. At the 9 a.m. hearing on the 19th which was 
scheduled to take up the federal government's request for a pre-
liminary injunction, Mr. Mallard, attorney for the United States, 
made this request: 
This order was obtained under the emergency power section of the 
Clean Air Act, which is designed to give the government the power 
to control certain emergency conditions. And it is not designed to be 
permanent or semi-permanent in nature. 
Now, the emergency conditions were the conditions of a two-day 
particulate count of 771 and 758, which did exist when the order 
was secured. Now, with improved atmospheric conditions, for 
instance, I understand that the North Birmingham sample for this 
morning, which was not a 24 hour sample, but a sample from 3 p.m. 
yesterday to 8 a.m. this morning was 217 micrograms per cubic 
meter which is unusually good for that area. Based on this and other 
consideration, our medical and air pollution experts believe the 
emergency situation has passed. This temporary restraining order 
has served its purpose and contributed to the easing of the pollution 
problem here, and we now request it be vacated, that our complaint 
be dismissed. 
We have no further requests.52 
The defendants, it seems, had been expecting something else. Sev-
eral had motions to dissolve and vacate the temporary restraining 
order and some were prepared to contest the preliminary injunc-
tion.53 Judge Pointer dissolved the temporary restraining order54 
and dismissed the complaint.55 The defendant industries could then 
resume production; several attorneys left the hearing to call their 
clients. Judgment was filed the same day.56 
LEGAL PROBLEMS 
The remainder of the article will deal with hardships which 
flow from the nature of the adjudication and with possible rem-
edies. United States v. U.S. Steel was hastily conceived. Late in the 
afternoon of November 17, the Environmental Protection Agency 
could reveal no concrete plans, 57 yet the lawsuit was started and the 
order was granted less than two hours into November 18. The rea-
son for the haste was the exigency of doing something to reduce 
the health endangering particulates in the atmosphere. The major 
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legal difficulty was the lack of notice to the defendants. In addition, 
the order, although denominated temporary, was, in practical 
terms, final because it required an immediate response from the 
defendants. The emergency was ephemeral and the order was dis-
solved the next day. Thus the order was secured and the emergency 
was over before the defendants were heard on the issues. The prob-
lems of notice and practical finality are interrelated, as both result 
from the factual nature of the legal problem. Certain conventional 
ideas about the litigation process, it may be observed, are ill fitted 
to an explanation of this case. 
Notice 
The temporary restraining order, as discussed above, was issued 
without notice to the defendants. The government's decision to 
seek an injunction was probably reached late on the 17th; and, in 
deciding whether to give notice to the defendants, the continuing 
health hazards to the people of Birmingham were probably bal-
anced against the procedural rights of the defendants. The decision 
to seek judicial relief under the emergency powers in §303 was, 
perforce, based on educated estimates. Weather prediction is an 
aleatory science and particulate sampling is, no doubt, subject to 
wide variation. Statistical bias and possible error lurk in every 
figure. The order was granted without notice in the early hours of 
the morning at Judge Pointer's home and required action from 
the defendants as soon as they were informed of its terms. The de-
fendants were informed that they were subject to an order of the 
federal court later in the morning either by a telephone call or by 
service of the order by a marshall. The defendants were surprised 
by the order, but the "writing was on the wall" for all to see, and 
it would be naive to think that they did not know something was 
about to happen. 
The 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, the Alabama legis-
lation, and the legislative history of both, reveal a change in the 
climate of opinion from apathy to urgency.58 The definition of an 
emergency, as the congressional sources show, followed the 
change.59 Any definition of emergency must, unless it requires that 
people be dying on the streets, be an arbitrary point in a contin-
uum of estimated harm. In April 1971, the particulate count in 
North Birmingham had reached 791, but there were no serious 
official statements that industry should shut down. In November, 
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however, when the particulate count passed 700, the stage was set 
for a different response. Pollution control has to start somewhere; 
and control started dramatically in Birmingham. Birmingham in-
dustry was not, however, prepared for the change in attitude. The 
new start was a shock in part because of earlier commiseration for 
industry. The substantive provisions of the November 18th order, 
although unprecedented, were authorized by the law.60 Attorneys 
for the industries were outraged. Some of the outrage should have 
been anticipated because of the drastic change in enforcement pol-
icy. Some of the outrage, however, could have been prevented by 
sedulous procedural fairness. Failure to extend procedural protec-
tion to the defendants exacerbated rather than ameliorated the 
shock and outrage which was due to the change in the application 
of the substantive law. 
Fair procedure should allow the adversary a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present his side of the controversy to the tribunal before 
it decides. Notice that litigation has been commenced performs this 
function because the defendant is informed of the time, place and 
subject matter of the hearing.61 If the losers have "the feeling that 
they are being fairly dealt with,"62 the pill of defeat goes down more 
easily. Conversely, the moral force and perceived legitimacy of the 
court's order is reduced if the loser views the decision as a fiat. 
Mr. Alley, who represented several of the defendants, commented 
at the November 19th hearing: 
It is the federal government that walked in and said y'all step aside, 
we take it over. But it is the federal government also that had no 
conversation whatsoever with these industries or their attorneys.63 
Mr. Johnston said: 
I have been a member of this bar I think about 42 years, and this 
court has, during that time, so far as I know, an ironbound rule, 
that they would not issue injunctions or temporary injunctions with-
out notice to somebody representing the defendants. This is the 
first time in my recollection it has ever been done with possible 
exception of instances of public violence.64 
and: 
The United States Government could have found out who repre-
sented these defendants, could have told them this thing was coming 
up, and I think this action by the EPA and Department of Justice 
is wholly without precedent in this community, and I want to say 
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that I hope this court will admonish them in the future. . . . [T]o 
come in here in the middle of the night and get injunctions without 
notice to me, is unthinkable.65 
Some of these imperious statements may be hyperbole or histri-
onics. There is, however, some legitimacy to the grievance and if 
notice had been given, this venom would have had much less sting. 
Other reasons for notice relate to precision in the litigation 
process. If the defendant is given notice and is present at a hearing, 
he can participate in the process of finding facts, applying the law 
and, in equity cases, formulating the decree.66 Ex parte procedure 
may be subject to abuse because, in the absence of the defendant, 
the facts will be found from either a verified petition or, as was the 
case in United States v. U.S. Steel} affidavits.67 The defendants in 
United States v. U.S. Steel took the opportunity of the November 
19 hearing to object to possible infirmities in the fact-linding pro-
cess and to argue that their clients had lost an opportunity to 
exonerate themselves. Mr. Alley argued: 
We have unprecedented situations where this court, on the motion 
of the government, in effect shut down 23 separate defendants' 
operations with not one bit of evidence that anyone of those 
defendants individually was contributing whatsoever to this cause, 
to this problem. There was no evidence that there was anything 
. . . (relating) this emergency to what a particular defendant was 
doing.6s 
Others were more specific. Some of the industrial defendants were 
more than 10 miles from the sampling station,69 others had already 
installed control equipment1° or had responded to the Health De-
partment's earlier warning.71 The industries to be enjoined were 
selected from a list drawn up in 1969.72 Thus some of the defen-
dants' points may have been well taken. The argument is a follows: 
if these defendants had been given notice and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present material to the court, then they could have shown 
factually that they were not contributing particulates into the atmo-
sphere. Some of the defendants' assertions were captious. For ex-
ample, it should not take more than 10 minutes of proof to connect 
any given industrial source to the general pollution problem. 
Nevertheless, because of the ex parte nature of the procedure, both 
the government and the defendants lost the opportunity to have 
an adversary hearing on the facts. 
There may have also been some fundamental legal arguments 
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that could have been presented to the court before the order was 
granted. Section 303 had never been used, and at the November 
19th hearing the defendants expressed some doubt about the legal 
standard as applied to the facts. Was there an "emergency"?73 Were 
state and local action having an effect?74 Did the pollution abate 
because of the order or because of a change in the weather and, if 
the latter, should the order have been dissolved earlier?75 There is 
the additional problem of formulating the decree. The temporary 
restraining order was less severe than the proposed injunction76 and 
seems to have been drafted with a view to avoiding unnecessary 
harm to the defendants. 77 At the hearing on motion to dissolve, 
some of the defendants argued serious production losses. Blast 
furnaces, if stopped, require several days of start-up time before full 
production is resumed; and Mr. Johnston asserted that "after clos-
ing down, it will take them five days to get started."78 Judge 
Pointer, whose sedulous concern for the hardships created by the 
temporary restraining order was evident throughout the November 
19 hearing,79 took the position that there should have been no 
harm because the order was drafted to allow the mills to maintain 
blast furnace heat and only required the defendants to cease feed-
ing new material,8° If the defendants had participated in formulat-
ing the order, many of these misunderstandings could have been 
substantially obviated. 
If notice had been given to the defendants, then the adjudication 
might have been fairer. Notice in advance of adjudication is the 
almost unexcepted norm, but ex parte temporary restraining orders 
may be lawful and, as a practical matter, at times may be neces-
sary.81 It is assumed, however, that the ex parte procedure will be 
used only in the exceptional case. Courts of appeals have criticized 
district courts for granting temporary restraining orders without 
notice when some notice could have been given.82 Rule 65(b) was 
amended in 1966 "to make it plain that informal notice which may 
be communicated to the attorney rather than the adverse party, is 
to be preferred to no notice at all. "83 Notice should be given "if 
feasible" and the Advisory Committee suggested that "some expe-
dient, such as telephonic notice to the attorney for the adverse 
party, be resorted to if this can reasonably be done."84 
In United States v. U.S. Steel there must have been a time, 
after the decision to seek a temporary restraining order and before 
the order was granted, when the government could have called the 
defendant industries' executives or their attorneys. Many of the 
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plants are 24 hour operations and, under the liberal provisions of 
Rule 65(b), a call to a night foreman could have been acceptable. 
Attorneys for U.S. Pipe and Foundry had specifically asked the 
government for advance notice of any anticipated legal action.85 
Nevertheless, no notice was forthcoming. The industries had to be 
informed of the order before they became bound by it;86 and, unless 
the defendants knew of the order, they could not have complied 
with it. It takes several hours to adjust a complex industrial pro-
cess; and a telephone call to the defendants after the decision to 
seek the order might have allowed them to take proper steps and 
thereby have advanced compliance several hours. The Environ-
mental Protection Agency's purpose was to end the pollution crisis 
by reducing particulate emissions. This purpose might have been 
better served if the early morning telephone calls, which informed 
the defendants of the order after it had been granted87 had been 
made several hours before the order was sought. 
It is, on the other hand, possible to view the matter differently. 
In retrospect, if notice had been given to the defendants by tele-
phone a few hours before the order was sought, they probably 
would have asked for a continuance to prepare. The crisis which 
called for action called for immediate action. If a hearing had been 
scheduled far enough in advance to allow meaningful preparation, 
there may not have been any need for the order because the par-
ticulate pollution might have been dissipated by changes in the 
weather.88 
The procedure used by the Environmental Protection Agency 
followed Rule 65(b), which specifies that "written or oral notice" 
is unnecessary if: 
(1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by 
the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, 
or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or 
his attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant's at-
torney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have 
been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting his claim 
that notice should not be required. 
The motion and supporting affidavits in the Birmingham case were 
conclusory and only 8 pages long. Irreparable and immediate harm, 
the first condition for an ex parte temporary restraining order, was 
"proved" with the affidavits in support of the motion. The possible 
weaknesses of affidavit proof have been mentioned above.89 
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The second requirement for an ex parte temporary restraining 
order is that the attorney certify the efforts, if any, to give notice 
and the reasons why notice should not be required.90 A separate 
certificate, however, is not to be found in the record. The motion 
asked that "said temporary restraining order ... be issued forth-
with and without notice, on the ground that the discharges consti-
tute an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of 
persons." The government did not assert that they were ignorant 
of the names of the corporation executives or their counsel or that 
they could not find the plants. Nor did the United States assert that 
"the defendant[s], if put on notice that a temporary restraining 
order was being sought, might be able to accomplish that which 
it is sought to enjoin before the order could be obtained."91 The 
government apparently felt that if harm to the public were serious 
and presently occurring, procedural niceties could be ignored. 
Practical Finality92 
The difficulties which resulted from the ex parte procedure were 
several. Since the defendants had no opportunity to participate in 
the fact-finding, law-applying, and decree-formulating process, they 
were irritated by what they regarded as judicial fiat. If there had 
been notice, some of the defendants might not have been enjoined 
and some parts of the decree might have been different. These hard-
ships were exacerbated by the nature of the order. The purpose of 
a temporary restraining order is to preserve the existing state of 
affairs until the court can schedule an adversary hearing. Tempo-
rary restraining orders are thought to be necessary because they 
may be "the sole method of preserving a state of affairs in which 
the court can provide effective final relief."93 Because of the one-
sided procedure and the possibility of abuse, temporary restraining 
orders are subject to severallimitations."94 It is not meaningful to 
discuss the order in United States v. U.S. Steel in conventional 
terms; and the conventional protections do not help the defendants. 
First, the order called for an immediate response: the defendants 
were required to cease, alter, or inhibit their conduct. Second, 
rather than laying the foundation for "effective final relief," the 
order itself was final relief. The pollution episode subsided, al-
though the precise reason therefor is unknown. Hence, the tempo-
rary order was at least the final relief, even if it is not certain that 
it was also the effective relief. After the crisis ended, there was 
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nothing left to be done except to dissolve the order and dismiss 
the complaint. Mr. Mallard, moving to dissolve, stated: "[T]he 
emergency situation has passed. This temporary restraining order 
has served its purpose and contributed to the easing of the pollution 
problem here, and we now request it be vacated, that our complaint 
be dismissed.,,05 The order, it seems, was designed to end a tempo-
rary emergency rather than to lead to future proceedings; if any 
such order is successful, there is no need for further proceedings.06 
The difficulty with the government's theory is that, to corrupt a 
figure of speech, it leaves things up in the air. 
The use of ex parte temporary orders to obtain final relief is 
nothing new. Despite the rhetoric about preserving the status quo 
and about "effective final relief," the ex parte temporary injunction 
has long been used to grant petitioners final relief, in the form of 
suppressing dissent,OT and, before the Norris La Guardia Act, in 
the form of breaking strikes.os Its innovational use in United States 
v. U.S. Steel lies in its application to a new class of defendants. 
Because of this application, industry has now been treated as labor 
was treated prior to the Norris La Guardia Act and as Martin 
Luther King, Jr. was treated in his Birmingham civil rights dem-
onstrations.oo 
Hardships 
The effects of the order in United States v. U.S. Steel could have 
been severe. In addition to loss of production and profits, possible 
damage to equipment and lost wages/oo corporate images were 
tarnished. Mr. Wagnon stated: 
In this day of public awareness of the responsibility of corporations 
to their communities, it's economically hurtful when the fact they 
have been subjected to an injunction, is publicized in the local 
community and national community and to their boards and to 
their stockholders ... 101 
Few would disagree with enjoining the uncooperative polluter in 
an emergency and most would agree that it is better to do too much 
than too little to end a pollution episode. Most would also agree 
that it is better to move with celerity than circumspection. Haste 
may, however, create injustice. In United States v. U.S. Steel~ the 
government's emission figures were almost two years 01d.102 One of 
the defendants, the W. A. Belcher Lumber Co., was ordered to shut 
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down its wood-burning boiler. At the hearing on November 19, 
Mr. Denaburg, Belcher's counsel remonstrated: 
It appears to us some time ago somebody made a list of the de-
fendants which included us on it. And my company has taken certain 
steps over the last year which ... included shutting down a large 
percentage of their air operation to such a degree that we take the 
position that we have not contributed anything to any pollution in 
over two months .... (W)e would like to ... get off this list if we 
can.103 
Mr. Alley commented, "If you ever get on it (the list), there is no 
way to get off."104 Any industry which, like Belcher, has been incor-
rectly required to halt operations because of government error may 
justly protest. The force of the protest, moreover, is all the more 
compelling if the error could have been reasonably prevented by 
giving notice to the industry before the order was secured and by 
allowing the industry to offer proof to the court. Given the fact 
that an industry is incorrectly enjoined, the problem then is 
whether that industry has any tangible remedies. 
Remedies 
The hardships for an incorrectly enjoined defendant are com-
pounded because they seem to be uncorrectable. Assume that a 
case arises where the defendants, similar to those in United States 
v. U.S. Steel) are ordered to halt production immediately to abate 
a pollution emergency. The order is granted without notice to any 
defendant, even though notice was "feasible." The emission figures 
upon which the order is based are two years old and, in the interim, 
new equipment has been installed which reduces the defendants' 
particulate emissions almost to zero. Assume also that there will 
be losses because of wage continuations pursuant to a union con-
tract and because of missed deadlines. The defendant, nevertheless, 
complies with the order. Two days later, upon plaintiff's motion, 
the order is dissolved and final judgement is entered dismissing the 
complaint. The defendant resumes production. There has been 
error: defendants should not have been enjoined; if notice had 
been given, defendants could have persuaded the court not to 
enJom. 
The order may be said to have been effectively or practically final 
because it requires an immediate response. If the decree has prac-
tical finality, would it then be appealable as of right?105 After the 
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order is dissolved, however, the right to an immediate appeal is 
not too important. First, if there is a final judgement, the defen-
dant may appeal from it. Second, as a practical matter, the question 
of whether the defendant should respond when informed of the 
order will almost always be moot before an appeal can be 
mounted.lo6 Where the order requires immediate action, neither 
a motion to dissolvelo7 nor an appeal will eliminate losses, although 
either may shorten the period of unnecessary compliance. 
The defendant could violate the order and argue as a defense 
to contempt that, because of the lack of notice, it is void. An erro-
neous temporary restraining order must, however, be obeyed pend-
ing dissolution or appeal, since a defendant who breaches an order 
may be precluded from arguing, as a defense to contempt, that the 
order was erroneous.10S Notice defects in temporary orders, while 
erroneous, do not void the order.lo9 Thus, the defendant, oppressed 
by a temporary restraining order granted without notice, may 
neither violate it nor appeal.110 His only choice is to obey or to be 
held in contempt of court; and the point, if one there be, is that 
temporary restraining orders are trial court law and depend on the 
almost uncorrectable good sense of the district judge. 
It may be argued, elaborating on the above, that the temporary 
restraining order is a final judgment because it was effectively final. 
Yet, as a final judgement granted without there first having been 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the judgement should be 
void.111 If the order has been violated, voidness could then be 
argued as a defense to contempt. Avoiding punishment is, however, 
not relief; and the voidness argument would be risky because it 
is novel. In addition, non-compliance with court orders is inevita-
bly a treacherous course.ll2 Once the order is signed and served, 
the defendant's safe alternative is to grit his teeth and comply. If 
the defendant obeys the order, the problem of voidness is about as 
important as the problem of finality.ll3 The defendant needs, but 
does not have, a quick method of raising his arguments before an 
appropriate forum. Yet, the Environmental Protection Agency has 
the initiative and the defendants have Hobson's choice. 
If the incorrectly enjoined defendant cannot be relieved from 
obedience to the order, may he later have compensation for his 
losses? There are several factual and legal questions left over from 
United States v. U.S. Steel which must be answered by an appro-
priate tribunal. What was the particulate count and the weather 
forecast? Does this combination endanger health? Is the affidavit 
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conclusion, that a particulate count in excess of 700 for 2 consecu-
tive 24 hour periods endangers health, based on a reasonable medi-
cal judgement? Were the state's efforts to abate the crisis attaining 
an adequate response? Which defendants were, at that time, con-
tributing excessive particulates to the atmosphere? Was the danger 
to health dire enough to constitute an emergency under §303 of 
the Clean Air Act? If there was an emergency, could a defendant 
who was not polluting be ordered to shut down and send employees 
home under the general power to reduce activity in an emer-
gency?114 None of these questions has been answered in an adver-
sary proceeding. 
If these questions are answered favorably to the defendants or 
to anyone defendant, may they or he have compensation for losses 
suffered because of the order? At the November 19th hearing in 
United States v. U.S. Steel, Judge Pointer wondered whether the 
district court should retain jurisdiction.l1Ii Counsel for the defen-
dants protested against retaining supervisory j;urisdiction and 
argued that jurisdiction should be retained only to determine the 
amount of compensation due their clientsY6 Judge Pointer raised 
the problem of governmental immunityll7 and, of course, dismissed 
the casel18 leaving the question of compensation open, as it yet 
remaIns. 
If the plaintiff had been a private party, the defendants could 
have adjudicated the issues upon an application against the injunc-
tion bond.1l9 The United States, however, is specifically exempted 
from the security requirement.12o Perhaps, here again, the defen-
dants are without a remedy. Short of a suit for malicious prosecu-
tion, the remedy against the bond is the exclusive remedy for an 
incorrectly enjoined defendant.l2l Because no security is required 
of the United States, it may be inferred that there may be no recov-
ery if an injunction is wrongfully procured by the United States. 
In other words, it is the usual case of prosecutorial discretion. 
Superimposed on this is the sovereign immunity, which bars recov-
ery of damages. The defendants, pursuant to the judgement and 
statute may recover costs,122 but that will be far short of full 
recompense. 
The Fifth Amendment declares that the United States may not 
take private property for public use without paying just compen-
sation. A cause of action, called inverse condemnation, is available 
to recover the value of property which has been effectively taken 
by a government defendant, even though there has been no formal 
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exercise of eminent domain.123 If the effect of government action 
is to deprive the owner of all or almost all of his benefit from the 
property, then there will be a taking in the constitutional sense. 
The government is not, however, required to compensate for all 
the economic loss which flows from governmental activity; and the 
problem is to determine when the burden should be borne by the 
public as a whole rather than the individual owner.124 The cases, 
unfortunately, are in a state of disarray.125 
Inverse condemnation would be a weak reed for recovery for the 
defendants in United States v. U.S. Steel. The courts have uni-
formly upheld destruction of private property to enforce regula-
tory policies.126 Congress has the power to enact the Clean Air Act, 
including the emergency provision; and that power includes the 
power to enforce the act. Property, moreover, was not "destroyed" 
by the temporary restraining order in United States v. U.S. Steel: 
the defendants were not allowed full economic use of their property 
for a time and it was "returned" to them intact. As Justice Brandeis 
stated in a dissenting opinion: 
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise 
of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore 
enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in 
property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to 
protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened 
is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the 
prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in 
the possession of its owner. The State does not appropriate it or 
make any use of it. The State merely prevents the owner from 
making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. 
Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious,--as it may be-
cause of further change in local or social conditions,-the restriction 
will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy 
his property as heretofore.127 
Excessive smoke which interferes with another's use and enjoy-
ment of property is an enjoinable common law nuisance.128 The 
public at large has a statutory right to breathe clean air.129 If there 
has been any interference with property, it has been caused by 
accumulated pollution from the defendants' factories;: and it is not 
reasonable that the public be made to pay (at least directly) for the 
right to be free from pollution that endangers life and health. 
The cases hold that "in times of imminent peril ... the sovereign 
could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that ... the 
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lives of many more could be saved."130 If there is an emergency and 
imminent peril demands immediate action, the government may 
act under the police power and not incur any liability.l31 There is 
an impressive body of medical evidence for the proposition that 
extended exposure to a high level of particulates in the atmosphere 
is a definite health hazard; and, although the precise point where 
particulate count, weather forecast, and health emergency become 
congruent is somewhat a matter of individual choice, the evidence 
supports the assertion that a particulate count of 700 for 48 con-
secutive hours will cause serious problems for vulnerable segments 
of the population and will even cause some deaths.132 The economic 
interests of the defendants must be considered in the context of the 
health of Jefferson County's people. As Justice Brandeis said in 
the dissent quoted above: 
[T]he right of the owner to use his land is not absolute. He may not 
so use it as to create a public nuisance; and uses, once harmless, may, 
owing to changed conditions, seriously threaten the public welfare. 
Whenever they do, the legislature has power to prohibit such uses 
without paying compensation; and the power to prohibit extends 
alike to the manner, the character and the purpose of the use .... 133 
The government, some cases hold, may respond to an emergency 
with measures which affect those who are not causing the harm. If 
the circumstances are grave and imminent, and if the measures 
taken by the government have a reasonable relation to the emer-
gency, then the government will not be said to have acted uncon-
stitutionally. The wartime evacuations of Japanese-Americans are 
an example. There, a racial classification which certainly included 
in a dragnet many who were not potential saboteurs (and certainly 
excluded potential saboteurs), was evoked to impose severe burdens 
upon those segments of the population. It was, because of an emer-
gency, upheld by the courts.134 Perhaps, in United States v. U.S. 
Steel~ some industries were enjoined which should not have been. 
The emergency, however, was grave, and the measures had a rea-
sonable relation to the emergency. Inverse condemnation does not 
seem to provide redress. 
A PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
Thus, the corporate good-citizen who has cooperated, installed 
controls, and reduced emissions may, due to an informational lag, 
be swept into the Environmental Protection Agency's wide net. It 
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may be ordered, at midnight, to cease production, yet, under pres-
ent law, it has no effective remedy. Few would quarrel with order-
ing a habitual polluter to close down in an emergency, but the 
plight of a defendant like W. A. Belcher Lumber Co. evokes sym-
pathy.13ri Congress should consider an amendment to the emer-
gency provisions of the Clean Air Act136 to provide recompense for 
those who may be incorrectly enjoined in an emergency. 
The amendment should put strict limits on recovery. Either an 
agency tribunal or the district court should have jurisdiction. Dam-
ages should be allowed if, based on information which was avail-
able when the order or injunction was granted or could have made 
available at a hearing, the injunction was either incorrect in gen-
eral or incorrect as to a certain defendant. Recovery should be 
limited to actual pecuniary loss, for example, wage continuation or 
a penalty for failure to meet a deadline. There should be no recov-
ery for intangible injury, such as loss of good will because of bad 
publicity. 
This proposed amendment should not stay the Environmental 
Protection Agency's hand; and the emergency powers should be 
as useful as ever. The amendment would encourage certainty be-
fore legal action and discourage ex parte procedure. It is always 
sound policy to exchange information; and enjoining defendants 
who are neither before the court nor informed of the proceedings 
has, at best, a marginal utility. The amendment would, in short, 
allow needed recovery for incorrectly enjoined defendants. It 
would, however, also provide a forum to litigate questions concern-
ing the Environmental Protection Agency's emergency powers. 
This forum may be useful, since, as discussed above, there is cur-
rently no practical way to question ex parte temporary restraining 
orders secured in response to a pollution crisis and dissolved when 
the crisis ends. 
CONCLUSION 
In November, 1971, the Environmental Protection Agency's 
emergency power was used for the first time. As has happened to 
other lawsuits in Alabama which have involved federal-state rela-
tions, United States v. U.S. Steel was reported in the national 
press.137 Several aspects of the lawsuit are subject to criticism. The 
particulate count was high, but Birmingham had come to expect 
that. The Environmental Protection Agency defined, and the court 
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accepted, a particulate count of over 700 for 2 consecutive days as a 
preventable emergency. While this may be commensurate with the 
generalized intent of Congress,l3S it is less stringent than the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's own guidelines for state emergency 
plans.laD The Environmental Protection Agency failed to give 
notice to the defendants before seeking the order and did not file 
a certificate to excuse notice. This violates both the letter and the 
spirit of federal rule 65(b). These defects created hardship and ill 
will both of which might have been reduced or eliminated by better 
procedure. The governmental litigant has more responsibilities 
than has a private party.140 It should not only be fair, but appear 
fair. The writer questions whether the Environmental Protection 
Agency met its responsibilities in United States v. U.S. Steel. The 
order in United States v. U.S. Steel can be seen as a dragnet, ob-
tained at midnight by arbitrary government bureaucrats. Present 
law unfortunately provides neither a forum to litigate these issues 
nor a means of redress for a defendant who may have been abused. 
Environmental protection and clean air are popular issues, but 
the Environmental Protection Agency should be mindful of George 
Bernard Shaw's statement: "There is no more dangerous mistake 
than the mistake of supposing that we cannot have too much of a 
good thing." 
There are, on the other hand, several factors which may have 
justified the order. The Environmental Protection Agency, after 
all, was not making a profit by poisoning Birmingham's air. The 
defendants' behavior in the past had been callous and refractory, 
and it was necessary to convince them that the government meant 
business. At the hearing on November 19, many of the industries 
proclaimed their desire to cooperate and be reasonable.Hl Perhaps 
it will be even easier to gain their cooperation in the future. In 
addition, if the order could have been issued before the 7 a.m. shift 
began, there might have been substantial wage savings to the 
defendants. There was a need to move with dispatch because of 
the imminent hazard to the health of several hundred thousand 
people. Notice there was none, but the crisis obviates the need; and 
the defendants must have known that something serious was about 
to happen. The order was tailored to industrial needs and based 
on the best information available. It was, finally, dissolved as soon 
as possible. United States v. U.S. Steel is cloaked in an overwhelm-
ingly opaque ambiance, much like an atmosphere full of suspended 
particulates. Nothing is very clear. Part of the shroud is due to the 
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clamoring compulsion of the emergency. Much is due to the En-
vironmental Protection Agency's unfortunate failure to act in the 
open. 
The November 1971 crisis and the case of United States v. U.S. 
Steel came in the hiatus between inchoate concern and operative, 
effective administrative regulation. There had been very little of 
the planning and coordination which could have eliminated many 
of the hardships.142 The public was alert, the legislation had been 
passed, and the standards were available, but the machinery to deal 
with the crisis was not functioning. If the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency had not acted, no one could have. In this sense, the 
action taken was exactly what Congress intended.143 State emer-
gency plans should, in the future, eliminate the need for federal 
emergency action. These plans will provide some certainty because 
they will be keyed to specific particulate counts and promulgated 
in advance by a regulatory body with expertise and continuing 
responsibility.144 Proposed control plans which require sources to 
eliminate or reduce particulate sources1411 could clean up the air 
over a period of years, and thereby elimina~e the need for any emer-
gency plan.146 
The final results are not in. Despite the furor of November, on 
December 3, 1971 the particulate count in North Birmingham was 
487. Not long after the November crisis, on the other hand, U.S. 
Steel announced plans for a new steel manufacturing process at 
the Fairfield works. This, it is estimated, will remove 99% of the 
pollution.147 Much has been done and more plans have been made, 
but a great deal remains to be done. Emergency powers, in the 
meantime, should be held in ready reserve. The real solution lies 
not through the drama of a shutdown order, but through united 
effort and hard work over a long period of time. 
-~-
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takes sole responsibility for errors and miscalculations in the article. 
My faculty associate Associate Professor J. W. Futrell, member of the 
Sierra Club Board of Directors and teacher of Environmental Law at 
the University of Alabama Law School, did not have anything to do 
with this paper. 
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